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Here and Back Again:
US National Security Interest in the
Arab/Israeli Conflict
Miriam Keim

Since its declaration of sovereignty in 1948, Israel has fought frequent wars

with its Arab neighbors—the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, and the First
and Second Lebanon Wars, just to name a few. Numerous peace treaties
have been drafted, signed, and sometimes enforced. However, even with
the concerted efforts of members of the international community including
the United States and the United Nations, a final settlement establishing
regional peace has not been attained. Disagreements range from Israel’s
right to exist to the delineation of the borders for the proposed two states.
Political leaders on both sides have agreed to, disagreed with, kept, and
broken numerous promises and plans.
It would be easy to characterize the Arab/Israeli conflict as simply
a religious disagreement: fiery rhetoric, often fueled by religious beliefs, is
preached by both sides as to the legitimacy of the existence of Israel. Religion
cannot be completely removed from the equation, as many contested
sites, particularly in Jerusalem, have deep religious significance to Jews,
Muslims, and Christians alike. However, the main motivator behind the
conflict is land, with both Israelis and Palestinians claiming their rights to
the area now known as Israel, as well as the disputed Occupied Territories,
including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.1
Any workable plan for establishing peace must take into account the
disparities between the two populations which live in such close proximity,
but have starkly different standards of living. Israel is a first world country
with a functioning economy and a government acknowledged by most of the
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world. The Palestinians are split into two groups, in Gaza and the West Bank,
and there are many more still in refugee camps in neighboring countries.
Both Gaza and the West Bank have semi-functioning governments, but
they are unable to work together and much of the international community
is opposed to working with Hamas in its current form. In 2006, pushed by
the Bush Administration to hold democratic elections, Palestinians in the
Gaza Strip decided to throw out the corrupt Fatah Party and instead award
control to Hamas, “the largest and most influential Palestinian militant
movement.”2 Originating in the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization
is responsible for terrorist activity throughout the West Bank and Gaza,
including targeted killings of members of the defeated Fatah Party.
Economic growth cannot be overlooked in the peace process.
Israel’s GDP is estimated at $206.9 billion, whereas the West Bank and
Gaza’s GDP is closer to $12.79 billion.3 Encouraging news has recently
been released by the World Bank concerning economic growth in both
the West Bank and Gaza: “In the first half of 2010, the economy of WB&G
continued to rebound and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects
that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth will reach eight percent
in 2010.”4 Both areas still have considerable ground to cover before they
can be competitive with Israel, but compared to where there were just ten
years ago, at the beginning stages of the second intifada, the advance is
significant.
In an ideal world, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders would
like their respective citizens to have exclusive control over the land now
occupied by Israel. It is possible that ardent Zionists and extreme members
of various Palestinian parties, including Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO), and Hezbollah, will never agree to anything other
than complete control. Yet, since the United Nations Special Committee
on Palestine (UNSCOP) first examined the issue, the policy of a “two-state
solution” has been seen by many as the answer to the conflict. The United
States has supported this position. President Obama, in his speech at Cairo
University declared: “the only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides
to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in
peace and security.”5 George Mitchell, the US Special Envoy for Middle
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East Peace, has echoed the President’s commitment to this solution in
subsequent interviews.

US Attempts at Diplomatic Intervention in the Conflict

In 1978, US President Jimmy Carter helped facilitate an Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty with the signing of the Camp David Accords. While the success
of the Camp David Accords was important at the time, the world was of
a different geopolitical power structure. The USSR was still a strong force;
it would not enter Afghanistan and begin its slow decline in power for
another year, and the dynamics of a bipolar world system were still locked
in by the fierce battle between Washington and the Kremlin.
At the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the political
atmosphere of the world had changed. The USSR was no more, and
independent states were establishing themselves again in Eastern Europe.
The United States had successfully rallied world support and secured the
Security Council’s blessing for President George H.W. Bush’s decision to
invade Iraq and push Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Ready to tackle
peace in the Middle East, an invitation to Israeli and Palestinian leaders
was extended:
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and
the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union
believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the
prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The
United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the
parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace
settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks,
between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and
the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real
peace. (Emphasis added)6
With this notice, the first post-Cold War peace attempts were launched.
Negations stalled and President Bush was replaced by President Bill Clinton,
but eventually both the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed to sit down and
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talk in January 1993. Nine months later, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and
Yasser Arafat signed the historic Oslo Accords on the White House lawn.
With this, Israel recognized Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization as
the representative of the Palestinian people and signalled its willingness
to negotiate with them. Arafat in turn “acknowledged Israel’s right for a
safe and peaceful existence.”7 The PLO was now in charge of selecting an
interim government for a Palestinian state. Finally, almost 60 years after
the UN’s original two state plan, peace was near.
Despite efforts from the Clinton Administration, this plan too was
fated for more conflict:
The Clinton team focused intensely, even obsessively on
keeping the Israeli-Palestinian tack alive and maintaining
momentum in the talks, but at the expense of debilitating
actions by the parties—Palestinian violence and incitement,
Israeli Settlement expansion, Palestinian Authority (PA)
corruption and constant backsliding by both sides—that
ultimately overwhelmed and defeated the process.8
While President Clinton continued pursuing peace, several other meetings
were arranged and publicized over his presidency, and the situation
in Israel continued to deteriorate. With the Al-Aqsa, or Second Intifada,
starting in late 2000, the final months of President Clinton’s presidency
were marred by the reports of violence throughout the region.
The environment that greeted President George W. Bush had
deteriorated drastically since the signing of the Oslo Accords. Additionally,
some felt that “the Bush 43 approach to the conflict lack both commitment
and a sense of strategic purpose.”9 The administration was not pulled
towards Jerusalem, but instead set their sights further east, to Iraq and
Saddam Hussein. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President
Bush chose to focus first on Afghanistan, and then Iraq. In the midst of the
Second Intifada, American interest at the top level was pulled away from
Israel and towards a different target. Like his successor, though, Bush was
not able to stay away from the conflict long and in 2003, “The Quartet”—
the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—
released a “Roadmap for Peace.” Announced soon after US troops
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overthrew Saddam in Iraq, the plan set forth “an ambitious three-stage,
performance based plan to stabilize Israeli/Palestinian relations, bolster
Palestinian institutions, and move the parties back to negotiations over a
two-state settlement.”10 Now, while engaged in building a democracy in
Iraq, the United States would also be encouraging the same activity with
the Palestinians.
This plan lead up to the 2006 elections in the West Bank and Gaza
through which Hamas won control of the Gaza Strip. Their conclusion
unforeseen, the elections highlighted the dangers of democratic societies:
sometimes the voting population wants someone who is an unimaginable
or undesirable choice in the perspective of outside powers. Fatah, although
corrupt and an unsavory ally for the United States, was a known quantity.
Not only was Hamas a new system to learn, but its penchant for terrorist
acts caused diplomatic headaches for the United States. Because US laws
against financing terrorism prevented giving money to the government in
charge, the Roadmap to Peace now had a new obstacle to surmount in order
to build Palestinian civil society with the hopes of a two state solution.
Another change to the peace process came with the November 2004
death of Yasser Arafat, long time leader of the PLO, cosigner of the Oslo
Accord, and a revered figure throughout the Palestinian population. He
was mourned throughout the Arab world, but Israelis greeted his death as
an event that might lead towards an eventual peace. However, just a little
over a year after Arafat’s death, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered
a major stroke from which he never recovered. With new leadership for
both sides in place, the Roadmap was approached again, but as of yet few
significant gains have been made. This is due in large part to the lack of a
valid leader for all Palestinians, creating a situation in which there is no
one head to negotiate with.
President Barack Obama ushered in a new age of diplomacy with
his inauguration in 2009. Recently, direct talks have been attempted, but
little has come from them. In the short time that he has been in office,
Obama has faced many of the same roadblocks that stood in the way of his
predecessors. The building of Israeli settlements continues to stir tensions
in Jerusalem and the West Bank, while rockets from Gaza are fired more
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often than Israelis are comfortable with. Issues that have been discussed
since the first attempts at a peace and a two state solution are still present
today. Where should the borders be drawn? Will right of return be enforced?
How does an independent state of Palestine exist, when it is split in half by
its neighbor? And the more modern question, how can a Palestinian state
that is internally divided be united?

US Strategic Interests in the Conflict

The

United States has financially and diplomatically supported Israel
since its inception, but it also has a strong interest in the Arab community.
The instability that the Israeli/Palestine conflict contributes to the region
greatly hinders positive development and seriously threatens peace efforts.
This instability is a particular concern for US national security, as some of
the grievances expressed by terrorist organizations in the Muslim world
stem from America’s involvement and support of Israel.11
Perhaps the most pressing issue currently is the Iranian regime’s
attempts to secure nuclear technology. Despite assurances from Iran that
the nuclear technology it is developing will be for energy purposes only,
many in the international community remain unconvinced that their true
aim is not to secure nuclear weapons. The recent Wikileaks scandal has
shown that this fear is held not only by Western countries, but also by
Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia.12 No county is more worried about
the threat of a nuclear Iran than Israel. Faced with overwhelming threats
from other Arab countries in the past, Israel has won militarily. A nuclear
attack would be different and much harder to defend against. The existence
of the program, coupled with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s
calls for the destruction of Israel, has led to ever-increasing tension in the
region. While the US and other international powers have worked to halt
Iran’s nuclear developments, Iran’s willingness to capitalize on this tension
only increases instability.
President Obama has promised to drawdown troops from both Iraq
and Afghanistan in the coming years. On August 31, 2010 the last official
US combat troops left Iraq, although over 50,000 “non-combat” troops
are still on the ground.13 These troops are supposed to be redeployed by
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2011, although the date of their final departure may depend on the ability
of Iraqi forces. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the Obama administration has
begun training local security forces to take over combat duties, with the
hopes of redeploying American troops from the country by 2014.14 Even
with troop withdrawals, the threat of terrorism remains high in the region,
with increased activity being seen in Yemen and Pakistan.
If the United States was successful in helping bring a resolution
to the Arab/Israeli conflict, Middle Eastern aggression against the United
States might lessen. In past peace attempts, the Arab League was heavily
invested in any action on the Palestinians’ part and would undoubtedly be
involved in approving and implementing any two-state plan that would
lead to peace. If sincere, the Arab League’s commitment to peace between
the Israelis and the Palestinians would represent an ideological shift in
most of its members’ thoughts towards the existence of Israel. If granted
assurance that their right to exist was acknowledged by the Arab League
members, Israel could feel more secure. Palestinians, backed by fellow
Muslim states and much of the West, could begin to build their own state.
Stability between the Israelis and Palestinians, and acceptance by Arab
states of the existence of Israel would allow the United States to focus more
of its attentions in other areas of the Middle East, and would potentially
increase the effectiveness of its foreign policy in the region.

American Use of Military and Hard Power

The

US military is the strongest fighting force in the world, providing
troops not only for its own missions, but also to supplement the forces
of multilateral organizations, such as NATO and the United Nations.
In Afghanistan, even with coalition forces in place, American troops
outnumber those from any other single country.15 With military superiority
over every other country, the United States could in theory use this power
to solve conflicts around the world. Korea, Vietnam, and Bosnia are three
examples of the use of “hard power” with varying degrees of success and
failures.
Despite the United States’ ability to use military power, it is difficult
to find many calls for such power to be used in the Arab/Israeli debate.
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Hard power has not been seen as a serious option for US responses to
various Israeli actions, ranging from expanding settlements to blockading
Gaza to full scale invasions. Besides the difficulties of fighting troops
armed with one’s own technology and well trained at using it, the domestic
backlash that a US president would face for ordering such an attack could
be catastrophic to any future political goals.
Former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens,
in an interview dated April 3, 2010, proclaimed that “the Obama
administration’s leverage is beginning to sound like ‘hard power’—
brutal even—to get Israel to toe the line.”16 He referred to the Obama
administrations’ objection to new settlements being built in Jerusalem,
a development that was announced while Vice President Joe Biden was
visiting the country. A month later, WorldNetDaily announced that “a US
plan envisions stationing international troops along Israel’s border with a
future Palestinian state….”17 However, the details of this plan are far from
brutal, as it envisions international peace keepers watching the borders,
similar to UN forces in the Sinai on the border between Egypt and Gaza,
and on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. Far from the combat troops
we see pictures of in Iraq or Afghanistan, these troops would resemble the
lightly armed, if armed at all, blue helmets we so often see in Africa.
American Use of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy

Regardless

of the exact reason, the United States has traditionally not
engaged in “hard power” with regards to the Arab/Israeli conflict.
Consequently an examination of its policy becomes a search for the use of
“soft power” instead. Soft power, or the ability of a “country to get what
it wants by attraction rather than through coercion,” is a concept first set
forward by Joseph Nye in order to explain why the United States was as
successful in its diplomacy as it came to be.18 In Nye’s words “this attractive,
or ‘soft’ power, stemmed from American culture, values, and policies that
were broadly inclusive and seen as legitimate in the eyes of others.”19 In
others words, the United States relies on other people wanting to be like
Americans, or at least accepting their way of life.
To this end, American government agencies, especially the State
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Department, rely heavily on the tools of soft power: “public diplomacy,
broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief,
military-to-military contacts.”20 Public diplomacy, a term that has been
used frequently relative to the WikiLeaks release, “refers to governmentsponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other
countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural
exchanges, radio and television.”21 While one might wonder if public
diplomacy sometimes crosses into the realm of propaganda, the concept
allows for a break from traditional diplomacy. Instead of interacting solely
on the official diplomatic level, the United States uses public diplomacy
to reach the citizens of the country it is trying to influence directly, by
“winning the hearts and the minds” of the people.
But how does a nation apply public diplomacy or soft power in a
country that is already so similar to itself? Israel is a democracy, and its
people enjoy many of the same freedoms held by inhabitants of the United
States. The attractiveness of American culture to a Pole at the end of the
Cold War, is bound to have been considerably higher than it is for a man
walking down the street in Tel Aviv today. The use of soft power with the
Palestinians is problematic as well, because the United States is seen as
pro-Israel within the Arab world. Indeed, President Obama in his speech
in Cairo stated:
America’s strong bonds with Israel are well known.
This bond is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural and
historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a
Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be
denied.22
Despite this, American authority has often been inserted as a mediator in
the conflict, particularly in the unipolar world that followed the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The issue facing American diplomats in the Arab/Israeli
conflict is not one of trying to win the Palestinians over, convincing them of
the benefits of the United States. In the same speech, President Obama also
laid out an American understanding of the Palestinian struggle:
On the other hand, it is also undeniable that the Palestinian
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people — Muslims and Christians — have suffered in pursuit
of a homeland. For more than 60 years they’ve endured the
pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West
Bank, Gaza, and neighboring lands for a life of peace and
security that they have never been able to lead. They endure
the daily humiliations — large and small — that come with
occupation. So let there be no doubt: The situation for the
Palestinian people is intolerable. And America will not
turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for
dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.23
Indeed, one of the biggest hurdles to overcome is not feelings towards
Americans, but instead to Israelis, still seen as the occupiers who have
stolen Palestinian lands. US national security interests in the region may
desire peace in order to obtain stability, but how does an outside power
contribute to changing the feelings of citizens in internal struggle who are
not necessarily opposed to the outside force?
The answer to both of the above dilemmas seems to be coercive
power. This author would argue that American policy has adopted neither
a solely hard or soft power position, especially in its dealings with Israel.
Elements of both exist. Soft power efforts are used within the West Bank and
Gaza. The Israeli diplomatic visits to the United States before the 1967 war,
to gauge whether they would receive US support or military opposition if
need be, show the importance of American military power in the region.
While the United States may not send its own troops into battle in Gaza to
fight Hamas rockets, it does not necessarily spring into action to halt Israeli
military campaigns, tacitly allowing damage to be done by Israeli forces in
retribution for attacks against their country. One could argue that this lack
of action is in itself the exercise of a type of hard power.
One form of power does speak to both the Israeli and the
Palestinian/Arab worlds. “For policymakers, foreign assistance plays a key
role in advancing US foreign policy goals in the Middle East.”24 Monetary
assistance has tremendous effects on American power in the region.
This funding, given in various forms to both the Israeli and Palestinian
governments, falls somewhere in between the use of hard and soft power;
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a coercive power, if we may.
For the Israelis, American financial assistance has been crucial to its
existence. According to the Congressional Research Service:
Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of
US foreign assistance and is the largest cumulative recipient
since World War II. Strong congressional support for Israel
has resulted in Israel’s receiving benefits that may not be
available to other countries. For example, Israel can use
US military assistance for research and development in
the United States and for military purchases in Israel. In
addition, all US foreign assistance earmarked for Israel is
delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year. Other recipients
normally receive their aid in staggered installments at
varying times. According to the Obama Administration’s
2011 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for Foreign
Operations, “US assistance is also aimed at ensuring for
Israel the security it requires to make concessions necessary
for comprehensive regional peace.”25
US military assistance to Israel is especially important to note. Before the
1967 war, France was the primary supplier of Israel’s military supplies,
but due to pressure from the Arab community, Charles de Gaulle ended
his country’s assistance. This void was filled by the United States, which,
since President Eisenhower, had been committed to ensuring Israel’s safety.
During the Cold War, Israeli pilots flew Western planes against the Sovietmade MiGs provided to their Arab enemy. Just as the United States was
committed to Israel’s military preponderance then, it remains committed to
a militarily strong Israel that maintains “its qualitative military advantage
[which] enhances security by preventing regional conflict and builds the
confidence necessary for Israel to take calculated risks for peace.”26
The United States also provides funding for Palestinian authorities,
but in a much smaller amounts and with a much more restricted distribution.
From the report cited above:
Since the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, US
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assistance to the Palestinians has averaged about $388
million a year. During the 1990s, US foreign aid to the
Palestinians averaged approximately $75 million per year.
Most US assistance to the Palestinians is provided through
USAID’s West Bank and Gaza program. USAID allocates
funds for projects in sectors such as humanitarian assistance,
economic development, democratic reform, improving
water access and other infrastructure, health care, education,
and vocational training (currently most, if not all, funds for
the Gaza Strip are dedicated to humanitarian assistance
and economic recovery needs). By law, US assistance
to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as for all other
aid recipients, must be vetted and audited to ensure that
no US funds are provided to or through any individual,
private or government entity, or educational institution that
advocates, plans, sponsors, engages in, or has engaged in,
terrorist activity.27
While funding for the Palestinians has increased significantly, it still reaches
nowhere near the more than $3 billion granted to Israel on a yearly basis.
Additionally, unlike Israel, Palestinians do not receive military aid or the
generous allowances for research and development of military technology.
Instead, they received funds for humanitarian assistance, economic
development, and other infrastructure issues. Highlighted in the passage
above is another problem faced by American diplomats and policy makers:
the presence of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
In 2006, prompted by the Bush Administration to hold the elections,
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip decided to no longer be governed by the
corrupt Fatah Party, and instead awarded control to Hamas, the “the largest
and most influential Palestinian militant movement”28 Because it is labeled
a “foreign terrorist organization” by the US State Department, no American
funds can be delivered to the Hamas-run government in Gaza.29 Since the
majority of the funding comes through USAID, a government organization
often associated with soft power, US assistance to the West Bank and Gaza
looks much more like aid given to other developing countries around the
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world. And, as with other developing countries, Palestinians receive aid
from sources other than the United States:
The EU is currently the largest multinational donor to the
Palestinian Authority. On 19 January the Palestinian Prime
Minister and a representative of the Commission signed
an agreement to pay EUR 158.5 million in support of the
Palestinian Authority’s recurrent expenditure for 2010.30
The presence of this foreign money raises an important question for
American foreign policy. If stability in the Arab/Israeli conflict is an
important goal for the United States, is it wise to allow greater assistance
to be given by another government? While one might hope that the
European Union has goals similar to the United States for its security, is the
American position weakened because the Palestinian community receives
significantly less US aid money than is granted to Israel? With the United
States still spearheading peace efforts, it seems unlikely that the EU has
usurped American importance in the eyes of the Palestinians, but seeds
have been sown.

Conclusion

In

an age in which Russia and China are both amassing power and
resources and are relatively unlikely to worry about the side activities
of governments that they partner with, the United States runs the threat
of being replaced in its importance if it is unable to increase its standing
within the Arab world. While America has acted as an important mediator
of the conflict in the past, the rise of other powers allows the possibility
that the United States will no longer be the driving force behind future
peace accords. This is a dangerous situation for the United States; it must
use its resources to combat that possibility.
As US national security strategy advances, “in the present strategic
environment, defined most notably by the threat from al Qaeda, the
broader struggle against Islamist militancy and the ongoing challenges
of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Arab/Israeli peacemaking has become
even more important.”31 With troop drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan,
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Iranian nuclear threats, radical Islam continuing its spread throughout the
Middle East, and the United States’ ever present need for energy, stability
will be at a high premium. While there is no unitary solution to the ills of
the Middle East—the region is far too diverse for that to be possible—the
United States must prioritize what conflicts it wants to have an impact on,
with some consideration to what conflicts it can have an impact in.
The Israeli/Palestinian debate will not disappear. It will not
dwindle down or become able to be pushed away when inconvenient.
Instead, the Arab/Israeli conflict is of strategic interest to the United States,
and America’s close relationship with Israel ensures that this will remain
the case. To preserve the credibility of the United States in the Arab world,
and to manage the conflict, the United States will have to decide how to
employ its hard and soft powers in more effective manners
If the Arab/Israeli question is of strategic interest to the United
States, how then should it proceed in shaping the conflict and any resolution
towards peace? Above all the United States must determine what level of
resolution it will be able to achieve that will allow for stability. With years
of grievances suffered by both sides, it may be generations before any
meaningful conflict transformation occurs, before Israelis and Palestinians
accept each other and allow for open democracies to exist side by side. For
the immediate future, the goal of conflict management is more attainable.
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